A kormányzás hatása a közvetlen külföldi tőkebefektetésekre Latin-Amerikában by Biró, Flóra Panna et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A korma´nyza´s hata´sa a ko¨zvetlen ku¨lfo¨ldi
to˝kebefektete´sekre Latin-Amerika´ban
Flo´ra Panna Biro´ and A´da´m Ma´rkus and La´szlo´ Erdey
University of Debrecen
November 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80025/
MPRA Paper No. 80025, posted 9 July 2017 13:49 UTC
1 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF GOVERNANCE ON FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
Flóra Panna Biró 
(University of Debrecen, 2016) 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of good governance on foreign direct investment 
in Latin American countries. According to the available literature the relation is generally 
positive i.e. good governance makes a country attractive. The relation is not obvious in case of 
Latin America and other developing countries as researchers found contradictory results. I was 
expecting a positive relation between the Worldwide Governance Indicators and FDI regarding 
the source countries, and opposite relation in case of the target countries. 
In theory it can be explained why high levels of corruption make the target country either 
more or less attractive. In order to have accurate results it is recommended to do the research 
for certain country groups. The study covers 18 Latin-American target countries, and 29 source 
countries that have been chosen from the largest investors in the World. 
Even though the FDI inflow is high - that can be explained by the level of development in 
the target countries, their connections with developed countries and the available natural 
resources - only a few papers have examined what determines capital flows in these countries. 
The time interval of the analysis is also an important factor in this case, as determinants of 
capital flows in the end of the 20th century differ from those of the beginning of the 21st century. 
The aim of my research is to find out whether these results contradicting most of the theory 
and empirical analysis still prevail in the region. This paper provides an explanation for these 
opposite findings, by focusing on previous studies with special attention to the relation between 
corruption and FDI. The gravity model was used for the empirical analysis, which is also a new 
approach to study FDI. WGI were included into the model as well, along with the basic 
explanatory variables of the equation. Separate tests were made for each governance indicator 
to avoid multicollinearity, and several model specifications and panel estimations were 
compared. Results according to the best model show that good governance is not always 
significant but mostly a factor of attractiveness. 
JEL: F210 
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Introduction 
 
Trade openess is an essential factor for the development of small and developing countries, 
it also includes foreign capital import. One frequently mentioned example is the Asian tigers, 
but capital inflows are equally important to Latin America as well. The GDP of many Latin 
American countries have been increasing remarkably in the last one or two decades. One of the 
factors determining this growth is foreign direct investment (FDI). (Wang-Wong (2009), 
Biglaiser-Deruen (2006), Zhang (2001)) The reasons for investing like attractive tax systems, 
or the available resources differ among countries. (Blonigen-Piger, 2011) Dunning (2004) 
mentions the growing importance of the institutional factors, as the role of good governance 
and economic freedom are also crucial points to detect the target country. On the contrary 
Blonigen and Piger (2011) while examining the determinants of capital inflows, found that the 
influence of governance and policies to attract FDI was falling back with time.  
Indicators describing governance in Latin America are quite unique. Generally speaking 
countries either have an average of good, bad or mid range values, but in case of Latin American 
states these values can be different within a country. In the majority of the cases the value of 
the indicator representing corruption is lower (which means worse) than the other indicators. 
Most of the Latin American countries are corrupt but the Regulatory Quality and the policies 
promoting the functions of the economical sector  can be as good as in developed countries. 
The indicators and their values will be presented in more detail in the chapter of Data.  
This distinctive characteristic raised the interest of researchers, so several studies were 
elaborated analyzing the impact of the quality of governance in Latin America. (Bellos-Subasat 
(2013), Biglaiser-Deruen (2006), Biglaiser-Staats (2012), Godinez-Liu (2015)) Indicators 
describing governance might come from different sources, but they represent similarly the 
quality of institutions. 
In this paper the Worlwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are used to determine the relation 
between governance and FDI. With the help of the six WGI indicators the effect of the 
institutional system on the capital inflows can be detected between Latin American countries 
as target countries, and the largest FDI exporters as source countries. Related literature shows 
that while examining FDI the zero or missing data might cause some problems, which are 
controlled differently. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) introduced a methodology which can 
be applied in this case, as it allows the presence of zero data in the analysis using gravity 
equation. Although gravity equation was broadly used for FDI, and in some cases even for 
governance indicators effecting FDI in the latter case the methodology of Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) has not been applied before. From this point of view it counts as novelty to 
use the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) to estimate this gravity equation. 
Considering zero flows are not only important in the case of Latin America. Latter it could 
be used to analyze any other group of countries’ FDI flows. 
The first section of this paper reviews available literature, first of all how gravity equation 
was used to study FDI, and what papers on Latin America concluded while taking into account 
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the quality of governance. In the second part the database will be presented, the third part 
introduces the methodology. The fourth part presents the results, the last section concludes.  
 
1. Literature review 
 
Researchers regularly deal with the factors determining capital flows. One of these factors 
is the governance which is defined as the traditions and institutions by which the authority in a 
country is exercised. (Kauffmann-Wei, 1999) Generally speaking we would suspect that good 
governance attracts FDI, as the investments are protected and costs and uncertainty is low. 
(Mengistu-Adhikary, 2011; Cole et al., 2009; Globerman et al., 2004) Although there’s no 
consensus on this statement. Good governance implies “independent judiciary and legislation, 
fair and transparent laws with impartial enforcement, reliable public financial information, and 
high public trust”. (Li, 2005)  
There are results that prove the exact opposite of the generally accepted theory, or that 
could not reach an unambiguous conclusion in terms of a certain indicator. This indicator is 
most likely going to be the corruption since its importance is diverse for firms from different 
countries. (Bellos-Subasat, 2012a, 2013; Alshammari et al. 2015) It matters which pairs of 
countries we analyze as it has an impact on the final results. Elaborating a study for the entire 
World is not impossible although loses robustness, since the characteristics that make one 
country more attractive than another are very divergent. To carry out more precise calculations 
the number of countries involved in a study must be limited by certain aspects. 
The lack of good governance in middle and eastern Europe transitioning countries was not 
an obstacle for the incoming FDI. These countries were experiencing the transition from 
socialism to capitalism, which left some gaps between the two systems. Unsettled legal 
questions created an appealing environment for firms that had already gathered experience in 
countries with poor governance. (Bellos-Subasat, 2012b) 
According to Li and Resnick (2003) the level of democracy and the protection of 
proprietary rights have a positive correlation with incoming capital. The 35 developing and 
transitioning countries studied in their article have been chosen from different continents.  
Mengitsu and Adhikary (2011) involved 15 Asian countries into their analysis on incoming 
FDI, apart from governance indicators they also used other indicators affecting investment, 
such as infrastructure and human capital. In their results out of 6 indicators1 2 were not 
significant, they concluded that those countries were more attractive that achieved 
improvements in terms of the significant indicators in the last 12 years. Cole et al. (2009) 
through the example of China investigated the effect of corruption on foreign direct 
investments, i.e. how important the level of corruption was regarding the regions targeted. 
                                                          
1 Voice and Accountability, Political stability and violence, Governance Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Regulatory 
Quality, Control of Corruption; find them in more detail in the chapter of Data.  
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According to their results if governance and the control of corruption is more effective it will 
promote investments.  
Most of the researchers analyzing only one side of capital moves find positive relation 
between the quality of governance and FDI. On the other hand, if the investigation is bilateral 
it might lead to opposite results. This is what makes Latin-America a particularly interesting 
region. Studies elaborated for this region led to contradictory conclusions. The fact that the 
literature regarding the relationship between governance and FDI in Latin American countries 
is not as broad as for developed countries, and the lack of consensus makes it important to pay 
more attention to this region. The impact of dictatorships this group of countries experienced 
throughout the 20th century have not faded away entirely. During the democratic transition their 
institutional systems went through a quick changes, which led that some rests of the old system 
remained till today. The most common example is corruption which is present in most Latin 
American countries. (Quiroga, 2009) 
In their research Godinez and Liu (2015) found that FDI coming from those countries 
which experience a high level of corruption tend to invest more in countries where the level of 
corruption is equally high or slightly lower. Despite this finding the increase in the export of 
capital in this case is small compared to the decrease when the source country has a low level 
of corruption and the target country has a very high level. The results are asymmetric although 
they show at an interesting point, that corruption can make a country attractive if the source 
country already has a high level of corruption. Even though their model led to interesting results 
the choice of countries is questionable. The paper lacks a proper explanation for the pairs of 
countries studied, and this can mean that the results are biased.  
Bellos and Subasat (2013) also studied bilateral capital flows. The countries in their focus 
were the largest capital exporters as source and the Latin American2 states as target. They used 
the gravity equation to estimate the relation between governance indicators and FDI. They 
concluded significant relationship, in some cases even negative however the impact was not 
high in either of the cases. Their data cover the period from 1985 to 2008. During these years, 
after most of the dictatorships ended, institutions of Latin American countries underwent 
exponential development. The majority of governance indicators improved, and trade openness 
increased which allowed more incoming capital. The results of this paper will be compared to 
the ones of Bellos and Subasat (2013), but focusing only on data from the 21st century. A similar 
investigation can result in more precise findings since governance indicators have not changed 
significantly in the last two decades.  
Using gravity equation to study FDI is not yet common, although it has been proven that it 
can also be used to describe capital flows. The distance between two countries and their 
economic weight affects FDI as well as trade. Studies using gravity equation for capital flows 
mostly examined other determining characteristics such as human capital or infrastructure, 
which are not necessarily independent from governance but they can also be satisfying or 
                                                          
2 With the exemption of those countries where reliable data was unavailable. 
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appealing in case of poor governance. (Bellos-Subasat 2012a, 2012b, 2013) Gravity equation 
requires country pairs which already increases the model’s robustness.  
According to an empirical analysis made for US companies good values for Rule of Law3 
and the strong judiciary4 is important to attract investments. US companies tend to invest more 
in those Latin American countries where the indicators reach a better value. The aim of that 
research was to study in more detail the relation between political freedom and capital flow. 
The results show that democracy and authoriter systems do not explain capital flows since the 
private sector can be well regulated in a dictatorship as well. (Staats-Biglaiser, 2012) 
Another paper by Montero (2008) analyzed if governance as a variable is introduced to the 
model, how would it affect FDI inflows. The relation was definitely positive, since governance 
is very complex and taking the average of all the aspects it covers will most probably result in 
positive relation due to the dominance of the aspects that affect positively the capital inflows. 
The costs of poor governance were taken into account. When good governance is considered 
as a cost reducing factor, it will attract investors more. (Montero, 2008) 
The OECD (2002) report says that generally speaking the presence of good governance 
itself can make a country attractive for investments. Although the idea is logical not every 
author agrees with it in general. When analyzing the determinants of investment in developing 
countries results sometimes show that even poor governance can be attractive. (Bellos-Subasat 
(2012a, 2012b, 2013), Godinez-Liu (2015)) We tend to think that good governance is important 
cause it will mean protected property rights which is very important for an investing firm. On 
the other hand the protection can be provided next to poor governance. Open countries 
recognize the potentials of foreign capital, so they will try to create an appealing business 
environment. However they do not want to give up on the good old corruption, which is also 
part of indicators measuring good governance.  
Bribe can ease up legal and bureaucratic processes, Méon-Sekkat (2005) describe this as 
“greasing the wheels”. There are different cases when poor governance will not be a problem 
for the investor. The first when the investor firm is used to these conditions, since it is originally 
settled in a poorly governed country or it has a subsidiary there. In this case it can take advantage 
of the lacks of the institutional system. (Aidt (2016), Mudambi et al. (2004)) The next on is that 
firms try to adjust to the particular environment present in each country. Most probably 
multinational companies are able to act as previously said. In the last case the importance of 
control is what makes a firm use FDI in a new country. An intermediary might be riskier than 
the costs of learning how to handle a corrupt environment. These are the so called 
internalization advantages. (Erdey, 2004) When a firm wants to appear on a new market where 
governance is poor it will most likely choose to use FDI as this is the method that can provide 
the most control.  
On the other hand the “sand the wheels” theory (Méon-Sekkat, 2005) explains the 
drawbacks of poor governance. According to this point of view firms in a country of poor 
                                                          
3 Rule of Law is one of the Worldwode Governance Indicators, it represents how actors of economy act 
according to the law, and how these rules can be foreced. Find in more detail in Data chapter.  
4 Independent judiciary, free from political preassure and corruption, is part of good governance 
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governance will be facing high costs. These costs are the bribe that must be paid, and the time 
since the lack of knowledge and information will make the arrangement of processes very slow. 
It will lead to costs as well when contracts can not be forced or the economic freedom is 
questionable. (Hart-Moore, 2007) These factors affect several governance indicators and 
naturally not all can be controlled which will hold back foreign capital.   
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1 Data 
 
This paper examines the capital flows from the largest capital exporters5 to Latin American 
countries6. Data covers the period from 2001 to 2012. Bilateral FDI stock data7 was collected 
for the capital flows, as the aim of the paper is to estimate them with the governance indicators 
which change slow in time. Flow FDI data is more volatile, since there are no capital moves 
between country pairs every year. The UNCTAD database was used to gather FDI data. The 
available time interval determined the period analyzed. GDP data was extracted from World 
Bank database.  
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) provided by the World Bank were used to 
repsresennt the level of governance. WGI was calculated every second year from 1996, and 
every year from 2002 for each country in the World. The indicators contain important 
information for the researchers but it must be taken into account that they represent a subjective 
evaluation of one country’s governance. They measure the quality of governance, “these 
aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert 
survey respondents in industrial and developing countries.  They are based on over 30 
individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms “.8 The WGI 
do not reflect the official opinion of the World Bank on countries and governors, and it is not 
used for the distribution of fundings. The governance is measured in a scale of -2,5-2,5, where 
-2,5 is a very weak value and 2,5 is very good. Neither of the countries reach the highest or the 
lowest value in any of the aspects. Generally speaking Scandinavian countries score the best, 
while African countries the worst. 
                                                          
5 Source countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brasil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom, USA 
6 Target countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
7 FDI stocks are presented at book value or historical cost, reflecting prices at the time when the investment 
was made. For a large number of economies, FDI stocks are estimated by either cumulating FDI flows over a 
period of time or adding flows to an FDI stock that has been obtained for a particular year from national official 
sources or the IMF data series on assets and liabilities of direct investment. (UNCTAD, 2016) 
8 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
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Voice and Accountability (VA) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism (PV) – capturing perceptions of the likelihood of political instability 
and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Government Effectiveness (GE) – 
capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. One of 
the most important factors for an investing firm. Regulatory Quality (RQ) – capturing 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Another important variable 
which probably will give positive significant relation with the FDI, because it can not be 
compensated with other advantages. Rule of Law (RL) – capturing perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. Control of Corruption (CC) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. CC is the indicator resulting 
contradictory results in different researchers’ estimations. Studies made for Latin America did 
not get to a consensus whether corruption attract or holds back FDI, example can be found for 
both phenomena (Godinez-Liu, 2015) Either the former or the latter statement is true for the 
corruption, an investor with enough experience and will to adapt to the environment, will be 
able to handle positive and negative outcomes of corruption.  
 
2.2 Governance in Latin America 
 
During the Age of Discovery the region was colonized mostly by Spain and Portugal, but 
some other European colonizers gained territories as well. They established an institutional 
system that aimed to exploit natural resources. After liberalization this system was their legal 
heritage. The recession they experienced at the beginning of the 20th led to general 
dissatisfaction among the population, which helped radical parties to emerge. Most of the Latin 
American states were under a dictatorship for decades. This meant autarchy and closing the 
borders which resulted in an even more severe depression. In the years of 1980-1990 
democratization started, that was followed by trade openness firstly towards developed 
countries and then to neighboring ones. 
The Latin American countries quickly realized the potential in importing foreign capital. 
Their main partners were USA, Spain and Portugal. After struggling with conflicts in the 1980’s 
and recessions in the 1990’s, the strengthening of intraregional relation by the foundation of 
Mercosur provided new investment possibilities. during these years Argentina, Brasil, Chile 
and Mexico became important  capital exporters in the region. Overall the lacks of the 
institutional system and the prevailing corruption provided some loopholes to the actors of the 
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economy. In the most popular target countries those factors of governance that were generally 
important to investors, reached a satisfying level, such as the Regulatory Quality or laws 
supporting the private sector. Those countries that were not attractive enough in terms of labor, 
natural resources and environmental conditions did not receive support to improve their 
institutional system, an example to this is Paraguay. (Caetano, 2011) 
 
1. figure: Capital import in % of the GDP (Stock data) 
Source: UNCTAD, 2016 
 
The amount of capital inflows increased substantially in the Latin American countries after 
opening to the world economy. The most outstanding states Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico in the 21st century even became significant source countries. The 1. figure represents 
the FDI stock in the % of GDP, which allows a better comparison of the changes between 
countries. Except for Guatemala all in every country the FDI stock in terms of % of the GDP 
increased from 1990. There are some cases where the value of FDI stock is higher in 2001 than 
in 2012. This can be explained by the fast GDP growth that many Latin American countries 
experienced in the last two decades, which means a faster growth rate in GDP than in the inward 
FDI stock. In the 2. figure the flow FDI data can be observed, however in this case the 
comparison between years is not that meaningful since there might be years of high or either 
zero FDI flows. It is clear that right after opening the ratio of capital was small but since 2001 
number and value of investments are increasing in Latin America.  
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2. figure: Capital import in % of GDP (flow data) 
Source: UNCTAD, 2016 
 
3. figure: Voice and Accountability between 2001 and 2012 
Source: World Bank, WGI dataset, 2015 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
   
   
   
 A
rg
en
ti
n
a
   
   
   
 B
o
liv
ia
   
   
   
 B
ra
zi
l
   
   
   
 C
h
ile
   
   
   
 C
o
lo
m
b
ia
   
   
   
 C
o
st
a 
R
ic
a
   
   
   
 D
o
m
in
ic
an
 R
e
p
u
b
lic
   
   
   
 E
cu
ad
o
r
   
   
   
 E
l S
al
va
d
o
r
   
   
   
 G
u
at
em
al
a
   
   
   
 H
o
n
d
u
ra
s
   
   
   
 M
ex
ic
o
   
   
   
 N
ic
ar
ag
u
a
   
   
   
 P
an
am
a
   
   
   
 P
ar
ag
u
ay
   
   
   
 P
e
ru
   
   
   
 U
ru
gu
ay
   
   
   
 V
en
ez
u
e
la
1990
2001
2012
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
2001
2012
10 
 
 
4. figure: Political stability and the absence of violence between 2001 and 2012 
Source: World Bank, WGI dataset, 2015 
 
5. figure: Government Effectiveness between 2001 and 2012 
Source: World Bank, WGI dataset, 2015 
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6. figure: Regulatory Quality between 2001 and 2012 
Source: World Bank, WGI dataset, 2015 
 
7. figure: Rule of law between 2001 and 2012 
Source: Worldbank WGI dataset 2015 
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8. figure: Control of Corruption between 2001 and 2012 
Source: World Bank, WGI dataset, 2015 
 
Figures 3-8 show the WGI indicators between 2001 and 2012. For some countries the 
extent of the change in the indicators is not very obvious, which can be explained by the fact 
that the indicators measuring the quality of the institutions change slowly on time.9 The 
indicators should be understood on a scale from 0 to 5, where 0 is the worst and 5 is the best 
value. None of the countries reach either the extremes. For a better presentation the scale does 
not necessarily begins at 0. 
In all of the cases Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay reach the best values. Chile was already 
an important trading partner for the USA in the 20th century. Due to this the USA payed special 
to keep Chile’s economy open and the institutions supportive towards international trade. In 
reality these goals were achieved by a military coup realized by Augosto Pinochet against 
Salvador Allende. Pinochet ruled under dictatorship in 1973-1990. (Yoshimichi, 2013) 
Colombia, Paraguay and Venezuela are the countries with the worst values. The indicators for 
Paraguay improved for 2012, but due the unfortunate location it’s prospects have never been 
high. Bolivia and Paraguay are two Latin American countries that are landlocked which affected 
their development. Opening to international trade for Paraguay was not easy at all, since it does 
                                                          
9 The first generation reforms during the 1980’ and 1990’ increased the standards of life and improved the 
institutions of most Latin American countries. The second generation reforms (Naim, 1999) were scheaduled 
for the 21st century, but never entered into force. The lack of the reforms slowed down the fast growing 
economies. 
1.00
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3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
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not have a competitive industrial sector and the country was affected by double tariffs10 due to 
the lack of a port. (Caetano, 2011) 
In all the other cases improving and worsening indicators can be observed for both source 
and target countries. In terms of governance even the developed countries struggle sometimes 
keeping their position. The indicator for corruption in the latest years was not only decreasing 
for Bolivia or Venezuela, but the USA experienced a deteriorating value as well. From this 
point of view Latin American countries are getting closer to some exporter countries. The 
Regulatory Quality has a better value for each country i.e. that the law promotes the function 
of the private sector, which is favorable for investors. Since the variance of the indicators is 
quite high significant results are expected between the target countries’ governance indicators 
and the inward FDI. The differences among countries can be informative and presumably 
important when it comes to deciding between target countries.  
The change one or two decades after 1980 could be even more spectacular, but the WGI 
dataset is available from 1996. Bellos and Subasat (2013) elaborated a similar study for 1985-
2008 where they mostly used the indicators from the PRS group to describe the quality of 
governance. On a scale from 0 to 6 even 3 unit points changes could be observed comparing 
the formerly mentioned two years.  
 
2.3 Methodology  
 
The gravity model was used for the panel data analysis. First it was introduced to 
economics by Tinbergen (1962), who proved that it can be used to estimate trade. The model is 
based on the Newtonian theory and is surprisingly effective in explaining the international trade. 
According to the theory the bigger the size of two economies are the trade among those 
countries will be larger, and the further they are located from each other the smaller the trade 
realized will be. In the model (equation (1)) the bilateral trade depends positively from the size 
of the economies and negatively from the geographical distance. 
 
𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝐴𝑌𝑖
𝛿𝑌𝑗
𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝜃   (1) 
 
Tij is the volume of trade between country i and j, Yi and Yj the GDP of country i and j, Dij 
is the geographical distance between country i and j, A is a constant i.e. the gravitational 
constant. The indexes (δ, γ, θ) are elasticities that show the change in the amount of trade in 
case of a 1% change for the given variable. The base model have been extended by other 
variables like GDP per capita, population, territory, common language or religion and 
preferential trade agreement. This methodology allows us to analyze separately the impact of 
each variable on trade. It is often used to evaluate or forecast the influence of a regional 
                                                          
10 In 2006 Mercosur countries abolished the double tariffs. This only affected Paraguay since it is a landlocked 
country, and the imported goods had to cross at least two borders to arrive. 
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integration of a preferential trade agreement. (Carrére (2006), Koo et al. (2006)) Gould (1998) 
used the gravity model to analyze the impact of NAFTA on the trade in North America, such 
as García (2013) to study the impact of Mercosur on the trade among the member states.  
Several reserachers (among others Bellos-Subasat (2012a, 2012b, 2013), Blonigen-Piger 
(2011), Paniagua et al. (2015), Mello-Sampayo (2009)) concluded that the gravity equation can 
be as well used to examine the factors determining FDI. Apart from the baseline model they 
estimate other variables in focus of the given research.  
The equation is estimated in a logarithmic form since this way the exponents can be 
transformed into a simple multiplication, and this makes easy to interpret the results. The 
parameters of the linear specification indicate the same elasticity as the exponents of the 
baseline model. Another reason for the logarithmic transformation is that this way the OLS, the 
most generally used estimation method can be applied. Although the formerly mentioned 
estimation method is very popular other alternatives exist. The econometric body of knowledge 
developed and present new possibilities for researcher to handle the usual problematic points 
emerging while studying international trade or FDI.  
In case of international trade analysis, the zero data is an issue as well as for foreign direct 
investment studies. The cause of this is that there are no capital flows between each country 
pair every year, therefore using stock data can improve the database. In the currently used 
database 60% of the data is zero which mean zero or unimportant amount of capital flows. New 
methodologies were introduced to cope with the case when the dependent variable contain 
missing or zero data. 
The easiest way to handle zero data is when they are not considered in the analysis, since 
the capital flow among the given country pairs is unimportant i.e. does not contain valuable 
information. (Linders – de Groot (2006), Frankel (1997)) Even though in theory this could 
work, but the model will be biased. This way fixed effect OLS or random effects GLS can be 
applied. When gravity equation is estimated with fixed effects the time invariant variables 
cannot be included, this can be solved by using random effects. (Bellos-Subasat, 2013) On the 
other hand this raises another issue, that it is impossible to control all the factors affecting FDI 
therefore using fixed effects improves the robustness of the model. Another alternative is when 
zeros are substituted with a very small number, like 1 unit which’s natural logarithm is 0. This 
can also lead to serious bias in the model, thus it is better to avoid it when a better solution is 
available. (Santos Silva – Tenreyro, 2006) 
According to Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) the gravity model should be estimated in 
its multiplicative form, which can be done by using Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML). With this estimation method the zero data is not a major problem and the database can 
still contain it. The most important benefit is that by keeping zero data the information they 
offer can also be examined in the model. It must be highlighted that even by including zeros 
and despite of the heteroscedastic errors PPML still gives consistent results, while estimation 
methods for log linearized equations fail. One interesting outcome by applying PPML is that 
results for GDP are not necessarily 1 which means that the elasticity is not always 1 unit, as in 
general after using OLS.  
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Even though PPML was first introduced for gravity models studying trade the authors state 
that it can be applied for FDI analysis as well. They have proven that the method gives 
consistent results in case of a serious amount of zero data (Santos Silva – Tenreyro, 2011), other 
researchers repeated a similar study where 70% of data was zero. (Gouel et al., 2012) 
PPML was applied to estimate the effect of WGI indicators on FDI. Fixed effect were used 
for the panel data analysis with year and country pair dummies. The main variable GDP of the 
gravity model appears in the equation to represent the size of the economies and capture the 
natural bilateral FDI. The baseline model is extended with the WGI indicators for the target and 
source country. Further variables can be included to the model, such as common language, 
common PTA, however these variables are time invariant and their effect is captured by the 
fixed effects applied on the estimation. The random effects estimation contain these variables, 
for which the results are presented in the sensitivity analysis in the appendix. The model has 
the following form (equation (2)):  
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑡 = exp⁡(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑇𝑡 +∑ 𝛼𝑘
2012
2002
+∑ 𝛼𝑆𝑇
287
𝑆𝑇=2
+ 𝜀𝑆𝑇𝑡) 
(2) 
 
  FDIST is bilateral FDI between S source and T target country at time t. The data covers 
12 years for 18 source and 29 target countries. GDPKt and GDPFt is K and F country’s GDP 
at time t. WGIKt and WGIFt is the WGI indicator of country K and F at time t, the variables 
were estimated in different models to avoid multicollienarity. Dummy variables AlfaKF covers 
country pair specific and Alfak covers year specific fixed effects. Distance and other time 
invariant variables are left out of the equation since it is captured by the fixed effects. 
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3. Results 
 
   1. table: Estimation of PPML for FDI – Year and Country pair fixed effects 
 Voice and 
Accountability 
Political Stability 
and the lack of 
violance 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law  Control of 
Corruption 
 Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source 
GDP 
0,347* 
(0,093) 
1,434* 
(0,197) 
0,424* 
(0,096) 
1,248* 
(0,166) 
0,453* 
(0,096) 
1,387* 
(0,159) 
0,428* 
(0,092) 
1,447* 
(0,183) 
0,191** 
(0,090) 
1,520* 
(0,158) 
0,337* 
(0,093) 
1,333* 
(0,182) 
WGI  
1,005* 
(0,344) 
-0,562 
(0,993) 
-0,113 
(0,114) 
-0,777* 
(0,251) 
0,519 
(0,394) 
-0,195 
(0,649) 
0,946* 
(0,253) 
-0,304 
(0,651) 
1,024* 
(0,198) 
-4,384* 
(0,921) 
1,041* 
(0,297) 
0,683 
(0,449) 
Number of 
Observations 
3756 3756 3756 3756 3756 3756 
R2 0,959 0,958 0,960 0,962 0,962 0,962 
Ramsey RESET test 0,379 0,793 0,139 0,360 0,849 0,114 
Note: * stands for results significant in a 1% level, ** stands for results significant in a 10% level. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Using PPML is the most convenient estimation method in this case since it is not only 
applicable for a dependent variable with many zero data but also gives unbiased and consistent 
results in presence of heteroscedastic errors, when OLS or GLS fails.11 With the Ramsey 
RESET test it can be checked if the appropriate model was estimated and that potential 
specification errors have been avoided. When the null is accepted the modell is free from 
specification errors. All estimations in table (1) pass the RESET test.  
Due to the amount of zero data special estimation methods are ought to be used. Other 
methods have been compared to PPML. OLS can only be used on positive data, since all 
variables must be taken in their logarithmic form. This can only be applied when zero data are 
eliminated from the database, which will lead to biased results. Despite of this Linders and de 
Groot (2006) suggest that it can be the simplest solution to the problem and the results received 
are satisfying.  
Compared to the former option substituting zero data by a very small number like 1 USD 
to get a logarithm equal to 0 could be a better choice (Frankel, 1997) Changing the data still 
raises the risk of bias in the model. In both of the cases the bias and the probability of 
inconsistent results depend on the characteristics of the database. These simple solutions can be 
applied with higher security when zero data have only a minor proportion, however the risks 
must be taken into account.  
 The sensitivity analysis presents the results for fixed effects OLS with excluding zeros and 
substituting them with a very small number. The results are introduced in table (2) and (4). 
There is a significant difference between the two estimations, which proves that it is very 
important how one handles the presence of zero values. The Ramsey RESET test rejects each 
estimation due to specification errors.  
The results of the random effects estimation, as used by Bellos and Subasat (2013), are 
presented in table (3) and (5) respectively excluding zeros and substituting them by a very small 
number. There is a big difference between these estimations as well. The low coefficients the 
authors had as results can be explained by the exclusion of zeros. The Ramsey RESET test does 
not reject all of the estimations but in most of the cases some specification error is present.  
Despite of the fact which estimation method was used none of my results show negative 
relation between FDI and governance for the target country. Even though the formerly 
introduced methodologies were rejected in this paper they still show an evidence that good 
governance attracts more FDI.  
As previously mentioned one of the PPML’s characteristics is that the coefficients for GDP 
might differ from the usual value close to 1. In case of the target country the highest value is 
0,428 for Regulatory Quality. On the other hand for the source country the lowest coefficient 
is 1,248 which is still higher than the values expected, when using OLS. As the source countries 
                                                          
11 See sensitivity analysis.  
18 
 
analyzed in the sample are relatively large economies12 a small increase in their GDP would 
lead to a high increase in the amount of FDI they send to Latin America. In case of the target 
countries a 1% increase in their GDP will result in an increase in FDI lower than 0,5% in 
average. Based on these observations it can be concluded that the size of the economy matters 
more for the source than the target country.  
The results for the WGI variables in most of the cases are significant only for one of the 
countries (for the target countries), with the exception of the Rule of Law where the results are 
significant for both countries and the Government Effectiveness when none of the coefficients 
are significant. For the target country in all of the cases when results are significant the 
coefficient is around 1 and the relation is positive. The studied source countries tend to export 
more capital those target countries where the governance indicators show a better quality of 
institutions. These indicators are Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality 
and Control of Corruption.  
The aim of the research is to show the relation between the governance in target countries 
and the FDI inflows. To elaborate the analysis it is not enough to include only the target 
countries’ WGI variables. These variable gave a significant result only for Political Stability 
and Rule of Law. When the estimates are not significant means that the given WGI is relatively 
similar among the source countries.  
The negative coefficients might raise some questions regarding the two indicators giving a 
significant result. Studies on the relation of the quality of governance and FDI conducted in 
Latin America suspected that poor governance can be attractive with special attention to 
corruption. (Bellos-Subasat (2012); Godinez-Liu (2015)) Based on their suggestions my results 
could have given negative relation for target and not source countries. Since these results might 
lead to some misunderstanding it is important to highlight that the negative sign for these 
coefficients – as for all of the coefficients estimated – must be considered ceteris paribus. It 
follows that – taking every other factor given – the source country which has lower value for 
the certain WGI tends to export more capital to Latin America. It does not necessarily mean 
that countries with low quality of the given indicators are significant capital exporters. With 
full knowledge of the database most of the source countries have normal or good values for the 
WGI, but those countries that have a value lower than the average invested more in Latin 
America. Examples are Brasil and the USA, and contrary examples are Austria and Denmark 
where WGI reach the best values but their capital export is relatively low to the region.  
The Government Effectiveness is the single variable which did not give significant results 
either to the source or the target country. Based on the model it can be concluded that the 
Government Effectiveness has no real impact on the capital flows in the case of countries 
studied in this paper. It raises some questions but the most possible explanation is that the 
indicator in its given form captures the government in a way that is not relevant for investors. 
                                                          
12 The largest capital exporter countries in the sample: Brasil, Mexico, Germany, USA. The GDP of these 
countries are among the highest, which is determining for FDI, as when their GDP grows they tend to increase 
more the FDI. 
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On the other hand the reason for investing must be taken into account, as the target countries 
are chosen based on different factors, which can mean that the Government Effectiveness has 
a minor importance in making decisions.  
In conclusion the results allow me to say that good governance matters, and generally those 
countries are more attractive for investors where the quality of governance is better.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The research question investigated in this paper was how the governance affect the capital 
inflows in Latin America. The different factors taken into account helped choosing the best 
possible model to estimate the parameters which would justify the conclusion that the better 
quality of governance matters.  
The estimates for the variables Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality 
and Control of Corruption are clearly positive. Observing the data there is no obvious pattern 
what could be common in the indicators. In all of the cases examples can be noted for 
deprivation or improvement, however generally in the last 12 years no significant changes 
happened. Being conscious of this it can still be concluded with high certainty that source 
countries prefer those target countries which have better values for WGI. The relatively high 
amount of FDI inflows to Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Panama are in line with the former 
statement. Except for Chile the other three countries are comparably smaller economies, 
although an appealing institutional environment can make them attractive for potential 
investors. The exact reason of investing into certain countries from only this study cannot be 
revealed, yet it could be a question of further studies, where the Doing Business Report could 
be much of a help. 
It is more difficult to get to a conclusion regarding source countries, although they were 
not in the center of attention in this paper, they worth to be mentioned. As already explained 
the reason for only two significant results is that the WGI indicators are similar among the 
source countries. Significant results show negative relation. Since the study has been made for 
the years of the 21st century four Latin American countries have been included, such as other 
developing countries like Russia, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea. These countries are 
becoming more and more important investors in the Latin American region, but their WGI in 
average is lower than in developed countries. The difference is the most obvious for the Political 
Stability and Violance and Rule of Law indicators which can affect the direction of the relation. 
It must be highlighted that the fact that the difference in their WGI is statistically important 
does not equal to a statement that they all have low WGI values.  
 The source country rather chooses those target countries where according to WGI the 
quality of governance is better. It must be taken into account that this paper only examines Latin 
American target countries, and 29 source countries that are the largest capital exporters. The 
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conlcusions derived from the results cannot be generalized for the entire world, at the most to 
the Latin American region but with due diligence.  
General problem of the economic models is that not enough variables can be included, 
since trying to get an estimate for everything would lead to meaningless results. On the other 
hand if the number of variables are reduced  we must control for the excluded variables with 
some method provided by econometrics. Choosing fixed effects can be a satisfying solution if 
the direct aim of the study is only examining the effect of WGI on FDI.  
This paper also proves that including zero data into the database is important. According 
to Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)  PPML is not the only solution, but until now based on the 
current body of knowledge this is the best possible choice when studying a variable which has 
often zero or missing values. Naturally it is better when the data is zero and not missing, from 
this point of view my database is rather reliable since it contains only a negligible amount of 
missing values. The area requires improvement, that is to say in further researches it is worth 
to go on with finding a solution on how to handle zero data, and what estimation methods are 
the best based on the aim of the research.  
Finally it could be useful to elaborate a similar study for other emerging regions of the 
world to get comparable results. After all it could be easier to conclude on the importance of 
governance in developing countries regarding the FDI they receive. Possible regions to study 
could be Africa, Central Eastern Europe and Asia.  
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Appendix – Sensitivity Analysis 
 
2. table: The effect of WGI on FDI, OLS estimation with year and pair fixed effects, zeros excluded 
 Voice and 
Accountability 
Political stability 
and the lack of 
violence 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption 
 Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source 
GDP 
0,325* 
(0,058) 
0,944* 
(0,078) 
0,363* 
(0,058) 
0,918* 
(0,080) 
0,408* 
(0,057) 
0,899* 
(0,077) 
0,370* 
(0,056) 
0,964* 
(0,078) 
0,333* 
(0,057) 
1,022* 
(0,084) 
0,336* 
(0,058) 
0,907* 
(0,078) 
WGI 
0,627** 
(0,295) 
-1,907* 
(0,508) 
0,028 
(0,086) 
0,351 
(0,224) 
0,581** 
(0,280) 
1,335* 
(0,409) 
0,855* 
(0,155) 
-0,476 
(0,393) 
1,013* 
(0,185) 
-0,885 
(0,559) 
-0,107 
(0,215) 
-1,238* 
(0,400) 
Number of 
Observations 
2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 
R2 0,2793 0,2742 0,2784 0,2837 0,2838 0,2765 
Ramsey RESET test 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Note: * stands for results significant in a 1% level, ** stands for results significant in a 10% level. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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3. table: The effect of WGI on FDI, random effects, zeros excluded  
 Voice and 
Accountability 
Political stability 
and the lack of 
violence 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption 
 Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source 
GDP 
0,563* 
(0,063) 
0,750* 
(0,090) 
0,553* 
(0,065) 
0,768* 
(0,092) 
0,581* 
(0,062) 
0,802* 
(0,087) 
0,598* 
(0,059) 
0,766* 
(0,084) 
0,555* 
(0,061) 
0,750* 
(0,084) 
0,583* 
(0,061) 
0,765* 
(0,088) 
WGI  
0,932 
(0,582) 
1,089* 
(0,317) 
-0,024 
(0,131) 
0,826* 
(0,233) 
1,004* 
(0,340) 
2,473* 
(0,487) 
0,887* 
(0,340) 
1,511* 
(0,431) 
0,973* 
(0,372) 
1,739* 
(0,381) 
0,118 
(0,312) 
1,304* 
(0,356) 
Távolság -1,036* 
(0,199) 
-1,088* 
(0,189) 
-0,994* 
(0,179) 
-1,098* 
(0,175) 
-1,035* 
(0,183) 
-0,970* 
(0,182) 
Tengertől való 
elzártság 
-0,644** 
(0,275) 
2,191* 
(0,293) 
-0,827* 
(0,282) 
2,207* 
(0,305) 
-0,436 
(0,278) 
1,853* 
(0,302) 
-0,497 
(0,291) 
2,118* 
(0,303) 
-0,545 
(0,285) 
1,986* 
(0,298) 
-
0,683** 
(0,275) 
1,998* 
(0,306) 
Közös nyelv 1,905* 
(0,321) 
2,037* 
(0,353) 
1,825* 
(0,317) 
1,877* 
(0,320) 
1,882* 
(0,314) 
1,898* 
(0,325) 
Közös vallás 0,028 
(0,229) 
0,085 
(0,239) 
0,253 
(0,222) 
0,141 
(0,226) 
0,155 
(0,226) 
0,165 
(0,229) 
Közös 
szabadkereskedelmi 
megállapodás 
-0,409 
(0,416) 
-0,507 
(0,420) 
0,095 
(0,424) 
-0,322 
(0,395) 
0,074 
(0,417) 
-0,139 
(0,416) 
Number of 
Observations 
2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 
R2 0,2663 0,2699 0,2745 0,2734 0,2749 0,2623 
Ramsey RESET test 0,3531 0,127 0,0411 0,0448 0,3161 0,0614 
Note: * stands for results significant in a 1% level, ** stands for results significant in a 10% level. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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4. table: The effect of WGI on FDI, OLS estimation with year and country pair fixed effects, zeros included (0+1)  
 Voice and 
Accountability 
Political stability 
and the lack of 
violence 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption 
 Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source 
GDP 
1,615* 
(0,262) 
2,143* 
(0,309) 
1,444* 
(0,271) 
2,398* 
(0,307) 
1,345* 
(0,268) 
2,364* 
(0,305) 
1,513* 
(0,264) 
2,353* 
(0,308) 
1,237* 
(0,264) 
3,080* 
(0,317) 
1,336* 
(0,263) 
2,070* 
(0,304) 
WGI  
1,254 
(1,191) 
-5,889* 
(1,773) 
0,052 
(0,394) 
-8,537* 
(0,871) 
0,246 
(1,196) 
-9,023* 
(1,743) 
-0,841 
(0,666) 
-5,287* 
(1,538) 
1,350 
(0,808) 
-18,551 
(2,050) 
-0,104 
(0,839) 
-13,591* 
(1,634) 
Number of 
Observations 
2504 2504 2504 2504 2504 6216 
R2 0,0798 0,0931 0,0821 0,0799 0,0911 0,0888 
Ramsey RESET test 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Note: * stands for results significant in a 1% level, ** stands for results significant in a 10% level. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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5. table: The effect of WGI on FDI, random effects, zeros included (0+1) 
 Voice and 
Accountability 
Political stability 
and the lack of 
violence 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption 
 Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source Target Source 
GDP 
2,108* 
(0,220) 
1,971* 
(0,255) 
2,163* 
(0,218) 
1,801* 
(0,258) 
2,080* 
(0,222) 
1,960* 
(0,256) 
2,147* 
(0,215) 
1,949* 
(0,258) 
2,175* 
(0,218) 
1,994* 
(0,255) 
2,131* 
(0,223) 
1,868* 
(0,268) 
WGI  
3,392** 
(0,582) 
0,387 
(1,078) 
0,116 
(0,497) 
-3,589* 
(0,916) 
2,799** 
(1,225) 
-0,187 
(1,617) 
0,460 
(1,080) 
0,743 
(1,025) 
2,415** 
(1,157) 
-0,650 
(1,110) 
0,926 
(0,922) 
-1,134 
(1,115) 
Távolság -5,269* 
(0,199) 
-5,643* 
(0,839) 
-5,407* 
(0,851) 
-5,171* 
(0,786) 
-5,550* 
(0,859) 
-5,492* 
(0,879) 
Tengertől való 
elzártság 
0,745 
(0,892) 
0,364 
(1,184) 
0,462 
(0,902) 
0,804 
(1,206) 
0,950 
(0,890) 
0,417 
(1,202) 
0,515 
(0,898) 
0,247 
(1,200) 
0,966 
(0,902) 
0,571 
(1,194) 
0,723 
(0,940) 
0,480 
(1,205) 
Közös nyelv -1,138 
(1,160) 
-1,786 
(1,173) 
-1,145 
(1,167) 
-1,179 
(1,182) 
-1,117 
(1,158) 
-1,233 
(1,188) 
Közös vallás -0,845 
(0,690) 
-0,543 
(0,713) 
-0,816 
(0,685) 
-0,777 
(0,691) 
-0,818 
(0,687) 
-0,816 
(0,705) 
Közös 
szabadkereskedelmi 
megállapodás 
-2,586 
(1,376) 
-3,633* 
(1,387) 
-2,860 
(1,572) 
-2,375 
(1,351) 
-3,100** 
(1,458) 
-3,274** 
(1,479) 
Number of 
Observations 
6216 6216 6216 6216 6216 6216 
R2 0,0770 0,0870 0,0768 0,0765 0,0059 0,0787 
Ramsey RESET test 0,0110 0,0011 0,0054 0,0138 0,3161 0,0028 
Note: * stands for results significant in a 1% level, ** stands for results significant in a 10% level. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
